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Security threats caused by the inappropriate actions of the user continue to be a
significant security problem within any organization. The purpose of this study was to
continue the efforts of Katz by assessing the security behavior and practices of working
professionals. Katz conducted a study that assessed whether the faculty and staff at
Armstrong Atlantic State University had been performing the simple everyday practices
and behavior necessary to avert insider threats to information security. Critical in
understanding human behavior is in knowing how behavior varies across different groups
or demographics. Because a user’s behavior can be influenced by demographic groups,
this study adapted Katz’s study by examining the influence on the security behavior of
four demographic groups identified by gender, age, education, and occupation. Like
Katz, this study used a 5-point Likert scale quantitative self-administered, closed-ended
questionnaire to assess the participants’ security practices and behaviors. The
questionnaire was developed in two sections: Section 1 used a binary scale to gather the
participants’ demographics data while Section 2 used a 5-point Likert scale to measure
the participants’ security behaviors. The sample population was derived from working
professionals at the General Dynamic and Program Manager Advanced Amphibious
Assault (GD & PM AAA) Facility in Woodbridge, Virginia. The total population at PM
AAA Office was 288, of which 87 or 30% completed the survey. Results of the
demographic survey indicate that (a) women were more security aware than their male
counterparts, (b) younger participants were more security aware than their older
counterparts, (c) participants who did not attend college were more security aware than
their college-educated counterparts, and (d) participants in nontechnical positions were
more security aware than their counterparts in technical positions. The results indicate
that a relation exists between the participants’ security behaviors and their levels of
security awareness.
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Chapter 1
Introduction

Statement of the Problem Investigated and Goal that Was Achieved
Security threats caused by a user’s inappropriate action continue to be a significant
security problem within any organization (Andrews & Whittaker, 2004; Blyth &
Kovacich, 2006). These security threats are difficult to detect because they originate
within a network or organization (Carroll, 2006). Inappropriate actions are defined as the
actions performed by a user (e.g., downloading unauthorized software, reconfiguring a
computer’s security settings, disabling a firewall, providing personal information, or the
disclosure of passwords) that can affect a system’s security settings or generate a security
breach (Blyth & Kovacich, 2006; Carroll, 2006). The intent of this study was to
determine whether the individual user is using proper security behavior and practices
necessary to avert inappropriate actions that lead to internal security threats. To better
understand the inappropriate actions by a user (e.g., reconfiguring the security setting or
disclosing a password), the author examined the relation between users’ security
behaviors and their awareness levels.
Defending against security threats resulting from the poor judgment or inappropriate
actions of a user has traditionally been the responsibility of the network administrator and
security personnel. In the 1990s, the interconnection of multiple networks (which until
then were somewhat isolated) and the proliferation of cyber attacks shifted the security
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community focus from system to network security (Arce, 2003). Besides dealing with a
proliferation of cyber attacks, security personnel must also deal with extensive web
browsing, instant messaging, peer-to-peer networks, digital media players, personal
digital assistants (PDAs), wireless devices, and a host of software applications that
interact directly and indirectly with internal networks and the Internet (Arce, 2003; Arce,
2004; Crossler & Belanger, 2006). In addition, the constant changes to newer
technologies is also making it more difficult for even the most dedicated of security
professionals to gain and maintain the knowledge and skills needed to allow them to
carry out their security tasks effectively (Blyth & Kovacich, 2006). As a result, network
administrators and security professionals continue to be in a state of constantly reacting
to the latest technical changes and cyber attacks (Raghavan, Sakaguchi, & Mahaney,
2008). Consequently, responsibility for the security or information assurance of an
information system has shifted from the organization’s security personnel to the system
user, who is perhaps the least trained or experienced in security matters within an
organization (Andrews & Whittaker, 2004; Arce, 2003). This shift in responsibilities
introduces a new set of security problems; specifically, the inappropriate actions of users,
such as disabling a firewall, providing personal information, or the disclosure of
passwords, are generating security breaches that can affect the entire organization.
To compound the security situation, users are also being targeted by hackers who are
using social engineering attack techniques to influence the user to perform inappropriate
actions that can generate security breaches. Bruce Schneier of Counterpane Internet
Security stated that ―amateurs hack systems, while professionals hack people‖ (Tucker,
2002, p. 10). Social engineering is the practice of using deception or persuasion to obtain
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goods and information fraudulently (Twitchell, 2006). Some hackers also use a
combination of social engineering with phishing schemes that use spoofed e-mails to lure
users to fake websites designed to capture sensitive information or to load a virus that can
create security breaches onto the workstation (Ohaya, 2006). These security breaches
may allow unauthorized access from potentially anywhere in the world and corruption of
data without physical access (Dark, Harter, Morales, & Garcia, 2008). Renowned hacker
Kevin Mitnick indicated that, for him, resorting to a technical attack was rare because the
use of social engineering was quicker and often more successful (Twitchell, 2006).
To mitigate the impact of social engineering attacks, private, academic, and federal
organizations must set ground rules for user behavior through security training combined
with security policies (Al-Hamdani, 2006; Mitnick & Simon, 2002; Ohaya, 2006). To
mitigate the impact of inappropriate actions, all organizations must provide individuals
with security training in the knowledge and skills needed to be able to recognize and
know how to prevent inappropriate actions (Al-Hamdani, 2006; Mitnick & Simon, 2002;
Ohaya, 2006). Today, private and federal organizations are using online information
assurance electronic training (e-training) to increase the security awareness of their
employees concerning the dangers of inappropriate actions (Ramim & Levy, 2006). This
online security e-training is intended to provide individuals with the skills needed to
recognize inappropriate actions and the knowledge of what they should do when
confronted with security threats (Blyth & Kovacich, 2006).
Current articles on the security behavior and practices of the user have failed to
consider how the user views security (Gross & Rosson, 2007a). Most information
security research has focused on such technical issues as access to information systems
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and secure communications (Siponen & Oinas-Kukkonen, 2007). Furthermore, research
articles and conferences have focused largely on human memory, attitudes, and behaviors
that are applicable to technical issues (Bishop & Frincke, 2005; Conti & Sobiesk, 2007;
Kostakos & O’Neill, 2008). Research regarding user security behavior includes the
following:
Surveying professionals to analyze their perspectives on security management
(Gross & Rosson, 2007a);
Surveying users via an Internet survey provider to assess their ability to
differentiate between privacy and security problems (Gross & Rosson, 2007b);
Surveys of Information Technology (IT) students, faculty, and staff in an
academic environment on their information security behaviors and practices
(Katz, 2005; North, George, & North, 2006, 2007; Reeder & Arshad, 2005); and
A study that focused on the behavior and practices of security personnel at
various private organizations (Suchan, 2003).
Before security threats resulting from users’ poor judgment or inappropriate actions can
be resolved, a baseline of the individual user security behaviors and practices must be
determined.
The goal for this study was to measure users’ information security behavior and
practices and to determine the information security awareness levels of users. Doing so
was accomplished by using a quantitative survey instrument that measured users’ security
behaviors and practices according to demographic groups. The sample population for
this survey was from the Program Manager Advanced Amphibious Assault (PM AAA)
Office of the General Dynamics (GD & PM AAA) Facility in Woodbridge, Virginia.
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The data collected were analyzed to determine the users’ levels of information security
awareness.

Relevance, Significance, or Need for the Study
Threats to information security are continuously growing and vary from organization
to organization, but the one threat that remains the same, regardless of the type of
organization, is the insider threat (Carroll, 2006), which, resulting from poor judgment or
inappropriate actions by a user, continues to be a significant security problem within all
types of organizations (Aytes & Connolly, 2004; Doherty & Fulford, 2005; Stoll,
Tashman, Edwards, & Spafford, 2008). Security threats, such as downloading
unauthorized software, reconfiguring security settings, or disclosing passwords, can make
a system vulnerable to attack, resulting in data manipulation, modification, destruction,
and theft (Doherty & Fulford, 2005). Such insider security threats are well documented
(e.g., Arce, 2003; Mitnick & Simon, 2002; Ramim & Levy, 2006). However, additional
research on approaches that potentially reduce or eliminate threats and intrusions remains
necessary (Doherty & Fulford, 2005; Knapp, Marshall, Rainer, & Ford, 2007).
In 1998, Presidential Decision Directive 63 (PDD-63) established the nation’s initial
goal for information assurance and a cooperative framework between industry, academia,
and local and national governments to protect the nation’s critical infrastructure systems
(Herrmann, 2002). Therefore, organizations are using information assurance to protect
their critical infrastructure systems. Information assurance is a security technique that
encompasses a defense-in-depth strategy composed of three components: technology,
operations, and people (Andrews & Whittaker, 2004; Blyth & Kovacich, 2006). In the
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past, the security community relied solely on technology to provide fast solutions to
security breaches (John, Maurer, & Tessem, 2005; Siponen & Oinas-Kukkonen, 2007).
However, people are part of the system, and failure to recognize this fact and address the
training of users can result in disaster (Bishop & Frincke, 2005; Katz, 2005). Until the
security community addresses the people component, comprehensive security strategies
cannot be developed (Arce, 2003; Blyth & Kovacich, 2006). Thus, determining whether
users are engaging in proper information security behavior and practices is necessary, and
if they are not, appropriate recommendations to correct any flaws in their behaviors and
practices should be made.
The significance of this study lies in its assessing user security behaviors and
practices. The results of this study provide security personnel in the private, academic,
and government community with an information-assurance baseline for security
behaviors and practices of users. Results of this study also can provide organizations
with snapshots of the current state of their employees’ security behaviors and a basis for
future research.

Barriers and Issues
One of the barriers to establishing sound user security behaviors and practices is the
mindset of the security community and researchers (Hazari, 2005). User security
behavior has received little attention from researchers because information security is
considered a technical discipline, with much of the attention being focused on such topics
as access control, password protection, data protection, and encryption (Hazari, 2005;
Katz, 2005; Siponen & Oinas-Kukkonen, 2007). Another barrier is the mindset of senior
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managers who fail to see information security as a ―value added‖ contribution to the
organization’s ―bottom line‖ (Jahankhani, Fernando, Nkhoma, & Mouratidis, 2007). In
fact, computer crimes often go unreported because managers and organizations are not
willing to risk public embarrassment or bad publicity (Hazari, 2005; Kshetri, 2006).
Earlier studies on such demographics as age and gender in terms of how they
impacted computer usage may no longer be accurate (Knight & Pearson, 2005). Knight
and Pearson stated that changing demographics in the workplace and their effect on the
organizations (e.g., the increase in the number of women and age) should be reexamined.
In addition, the constant upgrades to newer technologies and changes in security (e.g.,
upgrades, patches, and applications) make information security an ever-changing and
fast-moving environment (Al-Hamdani, 2006; Blyth & Kovacich, 2006). These ongoing
technology upgrades may frustrate users and security personnel who have to keep up with
all the changes. This fluid security environment may cause the user to become either
apathetic or hostile towards security (Gross & Rosson, 2007a; West, 2008).
One issue for this study is the reluctance or lack of responsiveness of individuals to
participate in surveys and studies (Creswell, 2003; Locke, Spirduso, & Silverman, 2000;
Nardi, 2003). This reluctance to participate arises from participants’ tending to (a)
distrust surveys, especially when the surveys address topics the participants are not as
knowledgeable in as they should be; (b) be uneasy in acknowledging and sharing bad
practices; and (c) be apprehensive as to who will see the results of the survey (Reeder &
Arshad, 2005; Shneiderman & Plaisant, 2005).
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Research Question Investigated
The purpose of this study was to use a quantitative, closed-ended, survey instrument
to measure users’ security behavior according to different demographics. The users’
behavior data were then analyzed to determine users’ levels of security awareness.
Measuring behavior is normally accomplished through the use of a questionnaire (Nardi,
2003; Singh, Cabraal, Demosthenous, Astbrink, & Furlong, 2007). The variables for this
study include an independent variable—the security behavior of a user—and a dependent
variable—the security awareness level of a user. The demographics for this study include
age, gender, education, and occupation and provide a framework to answer the following
questions:
Are female users more security aware?
Are users age 40 and over more security aware?
Are users with higher levels of education more security aware?
Are users in technical positions more security aware?
The intent of this study was to answer the following research question:
Is there a relation between users’ security behaviors and their levels of security
awareness?

Limitations and Delimitations of the Study
A limitation (restriction) that may affect this study but is beyond the control of the
researcher was the participants’ responses to the survey. Past research has indicated that
even trained security personnel are resistant in providing any information regarding their
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information security behaviors and practices (Katz, 2005). The delimitations for this
study, those elements within the control of the researcher, include the following:
The study was conducted with one sample population in Virginia.
Participants’ access to the survey was via a secure intranet.

Definition of Terms
Key terms used throughout this dissertation are identified and defined below.
Cyber attack – This term denotes illegal activities or a crime that takes place on an
information system, such as theft of software, data, unauthorized access, or modification
of information (Blyth & Kovacich, 2006).
Hacker – A hacker is a person who uses and creates computer software for
enjoyment or to gain access to information illegally (Whitman & Mattord, 2003).
Hacking – Hacking is the act of gaining access to a computer illegally (Whitman &
Mattord, 2003).
Identity theft – Identity theft is a crime in which one person masquerades under the
identity of another (Campbell, Calvert & Boswell, 2003).
Information assurance (IA) – Information assurance is an information security
technique that protects and defends information and automated systems by ensuring their
confidentiality, integrity, availability, authentication, and nonrepudiation and includes the
restoration of information and systems by incorporating protection, detection, and
reaction capabilities (Herrmann, 2002).
Information security – Information security refers to protection of information
systems against unauthorized access, transfer, destruction, or modification of
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information, whether accidental or intentional, in a storage, processing, or transit state
(Blyth & Kovacich, 2006).
Infrastructure system – This term refers to a network of independent, largely
privately owned, automated systems and processes that function collaboratively and
synergistically to produce and distribute a continuous flow of essential goods and
services (Hermann, 2002).
Internet – The Internet is a complex, diverse, wide area network (WAN) that
connects local area networks (LANs) and individual users around the globe (Dean, 2003).
Phishing – Phishing is a cyber attack that mimics a legitimate or trusted website to
convince victims to disclose their user ids, passwords, or personal information; it is also
being used in conjunction with social engineering attacks (Levy, 2004; McDowell, 2006).
Security awareness – Security awareness occurs when a user understands the
security policies, procedures, and practices in order to make sound judgments when a
potential security issue occurs in the absence of guidance (Boyce & Jennings, 2002).
Security education training and awareness - This process instructs users in their
responsibility to uphold the organization’s information system and security policies,
procedures, and practices (Boyce & Jennings, 2002).
Social engineering – Social engineering refers to an attack technique used to target
the individual, with the aim of stealing personal or corporate information; its action can
be as simple as asking the victim for information or can be combined with a phishing
cyber attack (e.g., an e-mail that promises new application features under a free trial
basis) in order to steal the user’s name, password, or other personal information (Mitnick
& Simon, 2002).
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Spyware – Spyware is an ad-based program that arrives through e-mail, enticing the
user to install or link to free software. Spyware can also arrive via instant messaging,
popular downloads, online gaming, and porn sites. Spyware is designed to track what the
user does, where the user goes, and what information the user transmits, which is sent
back to the hacker (McDowell, 2006).
Threat – A threat is the potential danger that a vulnerability may be exploited
intentionally, triggered accidentally, or otherwise activated (Herrmann, 2002).
User – This term refers to any individual or employee who uses an information
system (computer) locally or across the Internet for business or personal use (Blyth &
Kovacich, 2006; Boyce & Jennings, 2002).
Vulnerability – A vulnerability is a weakness in a system that can be exploited to
violate the system’s intended behavior relative to safety, security, reliability, availability
and integrity or to obtain access to some asset (Andrews & Whittaker, 2004).

Summary
Today’s network administrators and security personnel are being overworked. In
addition to their day-to-day operations, they must also deal with rising Internet usage,
escalating software upgrades, rapid introduction of new technologies, and increasing
numbers of cyber attacks (Arce, 2003; Arce, 2004; Crossler & Belanger, 2006; Raghavan
et al., 2008). Consequently, responsibility for a system’s information assurance has
shifted to the user, who is considered the least trained or experienced in security matters
(Andrews & Whittaker, 2004; Arce, 2003). This shift of responsibility is introducing a
new set of security problems, specifically, the inappropriate actions of the user. Security
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threats due to the poor judgment or inappropriate actions of users (e.g., reconfiguring
security settings or disclosing passwords) continue to be a significant security problem
within any organization (Aytes & Connolly, 2004; Doherty & Fulford, 2005; Stoll et al.,
2008). These security threats have the potential to cause great loss to the organization
and the user in the forms of data manipulation, modification, destruction, or theft
(Doherty & Fulford, 2005). Because these security threats are well documented (e.g.,
Doherty & Fulford, 2005; Knapp et al., 2007), there is a pressing need for more research
that can highlight strategies or approaches that might reduce these threats.
However, existing work on user security practice has failed to consider how users
view security (Gross & Rosson, 2007a). Most information security research has focused
on such technical issues as access to information systems and secure communications
(Siponen & Oinas-Kukkonen, 2007), but many nontechnical articles present themes that
are directly applicable to technical issues (Bishop & Frincke, 2005). As Kostakos and
O’Neill (2008) indicated, traditional human computer interaction (HCI) literature has
considered human-in-the-loop security issues as a design problem in need of appropriate
interfaces, interactions, and policies. Furthermore, Bishop and Frincke (2005) stated that,
without understanding something about how people interact with security, it is easy to
blame users for security breaches. Therefore, it is necessary to determine whether users
are engaging in proper information security behaviors and practices and, if not, to make
appropriate recommendations to correct any flaws in their behaviors and practices.
Before these inappropriate actions can be resolved, an initial baseline of the common user
security behaviors and practices must be determined. The goal of this study was to
continue the efforts by Katz (2005) in assessing user information-security behaviors and
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practices in order to determine the information-security awareness level of users in an
organization, specifically according to demographic group.
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Chapter 2
Review of the Literature

This chapter presents a summary of the published research in the area of information
security and, specifically, on the behaviors and practices of individual users. After a
section addressing the background information, the main topics include insider security
threats, user behavior, and security awareness and training. The chapter concludes with a
summary of what is known and unknown in research literature, the contribution of this
study, and a chapter summary.

Background
Threats can be classified into three broad categories: natural, internal, and external
(Blyth & Kovacich, 2006). The natural threat is, as the name implies, any natural
disaster—such as fire, flood, power failure, earthquake, and mudslide—that can cause
damage or loss of data to a system. The internal or insider threat occurs when a party or
person knowingly or unknowingly causes damage or loss of data to a system (Blyth &
Kovacich, 2006). The external threat is the more familiar threat and includes a hacker
trying to gain access to a system (Blyth & Kovacich, 2006; Carroll, 2006). Defending
against these security threats has traditionally been the responsibility of the network
administrator and the security personnel. Today, these network administrators and
security professionals are being overworked (Raghavan et al., 2008). Besides having to
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maintain their current network’s security, personnel must also deal with extensive web
browsing, instant messaging, peer-to-peer networks, digital media players, personal
digital assistants (PDAs), wireless devices, a host of software applications that interact
directly and indirectly with internal networks and the Internet, unknown software flaws
that can create security threats, and a proliferation of cyber attacks (Arce, 2003).
In addition to this increased workload, the continuing escalation of newer
technologies and security tools is also making it more difficult for even the most
dedicated of security professionals to gain and maintain the knowledge and skills needed
to allow them to effectively carry out their security tasks (Al-Hamdani, 2006; Blyth &
Kovacich, 2006). Because security risks can change as quickly as new threats,
vulnerabilities, and attack tools are introduced, security must now be designed as a
continuous process that reacts quickly to changes (Al-Hamdani, 2006; Raghavan et al.,
2008). All these security issues, in conjunction with an existing acute shortage of
administrators and security personnel, are compelling organizations to shift the
responsibility of information system security to the user, who is perhaps the least trained
or experienced in security matters (Arce, 2003). This shift in responsibilities is exposing
the organization to the possibility of increased insider security threats and, specifically, to
the inappropriate actions of users (Andrews & Whittaker, 2004; Blyth & Kovacich,
2006).

Insider Security Threats
Threats to information security are always increasing and vary from organization to
organization, but the one threat that remains the same regardless of the type of
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organization is the insider threat (Carroll, 2006). Insider security threats may not occur
as frequently as external attacks, but they have a higher rate of success, can go undetected
and pose a greater risk than an external attack (Chinchani, Iyer, Ngo, & Upadhyaya,
2005). Insider threats can be classified into two categories: the intentional and the
unintentional threat (Carroll, 2006). The intentional threat occurs when a party or trusted
person within the organization knowingly sets out to cause damage or loss of data to a
system (Blyth & Kovacich, 2006). The intentional threat can be anything from an
employee creating a security risk for malicious reasons or personal gain to the more
familiar threat of a hacker trying to gain access to a system (Blyth & Kovacich, 2006;
Carroll, 2006). The intentional threat is a more serious threat to information security in
that hackers and criminals have learned to manipulate users into divulging confidential
information with a technique called social engineering (Aytes & Connolly, 2004). As
Bruce Schneier of Counterpane Internet Security stated, ―[A]mateurs hack systems, while
professionals hack people‖ (Tucker, 2002, p. 10). Renowned hacker Kevin Mitnick
indicated that, for him, resorting to a technical attack was rare because the use of social
engineering was quicker and often more successful (Twitchell, 2006).
Trust plays a key role in the user’s decision-making process (Tsai & Egelman, 2006).
Trustworthy users can fail to be trustworthy when it comes to protecting their systems
due to inadequate education, negligence, and various social pressures (Orgill, Romney,
Bailey, & Orgill, 2004). Furthermore, the trust that people put in websites has enabled
hackers to easily deceive people at all levels of income and education (MacInnes,
Musgrave, & Laska, 2005). Social engineering attacks exploit the user’s trust by
influencing the user to perform inappropriate actions so that information can be stolen or
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security breaches can be generated (Orgill et al., 2004; Twitchell, 2006). Some hackers
also use a combination of social engineering with phishing attacks that use spoofed emails to lure users to fake websites designed to capture sensitive information or to load a
virus onto the workstation, thereby creating security breaches (Kumaraguru et al., 2007;
Ohaya, 2006). These security breaches may allow unauthorized access from potentially
anywhere in the world and corruption of data without physical access (Dark et al., 2008).
Studies have indicated that a large number of people fall for these phishing attacks even
when the participants are made aware that their ability to identify phishing attacks is
being tested (Kumaraguru et al., 2007). Many of these phishing attacks were not even
detected; therefore, things may be worse than reported because attackers are often able to
hide their tracks by disabling logging facilities or modifying event logs so their activity
goes undetected (Kemmerer, 2003). To mitigate the impact from social engineering
attacks, organizations must set ground rules for user behaviors through the use of security
training combined with security policies (Al-Hamdani, 2006; Mitnick & Simon, 2002;
Ohaya, 2006).
The unintentional threat occurs when a trusted person within the organization causes
damage or loss of data or service without direct intent (Blyth & Kovacich, 2006).
Unintentional threats can be caused by anything from leaving a laptop or sensitive
document unattended, to inadvertently installing software with an unknown flaw or bug
that can create a security risk (Andrews & Whittaker, 2004; Blyth & Kovacich, 2006).
Other unintentional threats from due to users’ poor judgment include opening e-mail
attachments without checking for viruses, downloading unauthorized software,
reconfiguring the system security setting, disabling a firewall to access an unauthorized
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website, and providing personal information or a password to a coworker (Blyth &
Kovacich, 2006; Carroll, 2006). As more users become responsible for their own system
security, the number of unintentional security threats will increase (Chinchani et al.,
2005). Because organizations have their information infrastructure connected, the
unintentional threat by one user can lead to a security breach affecting the entire
infrastructure (Aytes & Connolly, 2004). These security breaches have the potential to
generate great loss for the organization and the user in the form of data manipulation,
modification, destruction, or theft (Chinchani et al., 2005; Doherty & Fulford, 2005;
Gross & Rosson, 2007a). Carroll (2006) stated that the unintentional compromise of
information by an insider can be a product of a lack of security awareness or a failure to
adhere to security policies. To overcome these unintentional threats, the security
community must understand the mindset or behavior of the user in order to develop
appropriate security countermeasures (Conti & Sobiesk, 2007; Vatsa, Sural, &
Majumdar, 2007). These insider threats are creating a pressing need for more research
that can highlight strategies or approaches that might reduce the insider threat (Doherty &
Fulford, 2005; Knapp et al., 2007).
In 1998, Presidential Decision Directive 63 (PDD-63) established the nation’s initial
goal for information assurance and a cooperative framework for industry, academia, and
local and national governments to protect the nation’s critical infrastructure systems
(Herrmann, 2002). Therefore, organizations are using information assurance to protect
their critical infrastructure systems. Information assurance is an information security
technique that encompasses a defense-in-depth strategy composed of three components:
technology, operations, and people (Andrews & Whittaker, 2004; Blyth & Kovacich,
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2006). These components form the foundation and framework for developing a
comprehensive security strategy (Blyth & Kovacich, 2006).
In the past, the majority of security threats were external and could be prevented or
solved by using technical solutions such as firewalls and antivirus software (Arce, 2003).
Current technical solutions are using mathematical approaches that include biometrical
authentication, virtual private networks, and cryptographic techniques (Siponen & OinasKukkonen, 2007). Detecting the insider threat, however, is more difficult because there
is no way to monitor a person’s actions or intent (Carroll, 2006). Most attempts in
preventing insider threats involve (a) technical solutions such as firewall logs, intrusion
detection systems (IDS), and honeypots or (b) security policies such as procedures that
govern the actions and behavior of personnel within an organization (Carroll, 2006;
Doherty & Fulford, 2005; Stahl, 2004). Technical solution such as honeypots can be
designed to detect, identify, and confirm insider threats (Spitzner, 2003). Restraints on
these technical solutions include the insider threat bypassing or introducing bogus or false
information to mislead security personnel (Spitzner, 2003). On the other hand, restraints
in implementing security policies include (a) cost—implementing policies takes time and
money that are usually unbudgeted—, (b) organizational priorities—ongoing projects
cannot be interrupted for the sake of imposing standards—, (c) policy age—policies
should be updated regularly to reflect current technologies and security situation—, and
(d) enforcement—policies by themselves are not very useful if not enforced (Carroll,
2006; Doherty & Fulford, 2005; Moore, 2004; Stefanek, 2002). Understanding users’
behavior in security decision making is an avenue that may improve training in usersecurity behavior (West, 2008).
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User Behavior
Insecure behavior by individual users is now considered one of the major chinks in
the armor of computer-security countermeasures (Aytes & Connolly, 2004). Carroll
(2006) indicated that personnel are among the biggest threats to the information security
of an organization. In addition, Bishop and Frincke (2005) stated that, ultimately,
information security is more about people than computers and information. Thus,
security solutions that fail to take human nature into account are doomed (Bishop &
Frincke, 2005). However, very little is known about why users choose to engage in
unsafe security behavior (Aytes & Connolly, 2004). Two reasons for why proper
security behavior is difficult to achieve include the mindset of the user and management.
User mindset includes (a) user attitude—that is, inappropriate actions continue because
many users, despite having little to no formal training in computer security, feel relatively
comfortable in their ability to protect themselves from viruses, computer crashes, and
password violations (West, 2008)—, (b) security risk—that is, many users believe that
they are not at risk because they generally do not understand security risk: The
components of security risk such as threats, vulnerabilities, and the value of information
are poorly understood and are often misjudged (West, 2008)—, (c) lack of motivation—
most users are either intimidated by the very concept of networking or they simply do not
care enough about the topic to actively learn (West, 2008)—, (d) user priorities—users
are usually busy with their assignments with little time for security training, so they resist
such training (Tucker, 2002)—, and (e) user indifference—that is, users who simply
refuse to comply with an organization’s information security policies and procedures can
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frustrate the security manager who spent the time in creating these policies and
procedures (Tucker, 2002).
Management mindset includes management resources, cost of security, and security
priorities. In terms of management resources, despite increased security threats,
organizations traditionally allocate very little of the IT budget to information security. In
fact, the average amount of money as a percentage of revenue spent on security is
0.0025%, or slightly less than what is spent on coffee (Hazari, 2005). Furthermore,
because security costs time and money, business managers often forgo security in order
to implement a system or service that is faster and cheaper (Stefanek, 2002). In terms of
security priorities and support, network administrators often have limited resources,
making user security training the first casualty as departments trim projects (Tucker,
2002). In addition, shrinking IT budgets are forcing IT directors to reduce staff by
eliminating the more expensive qualified employees and replacing them with less
expensive untrained or unqualified employees, at the risk of leaving security training to
unqualified or untrained personnel (Stefanek, 2002). Moreover, IT managers often
struggle with getting fellow department managers to provide time for employees to
receive security training (Stefanek, 2002). Finally, IT managers have come to depend on
technology to solve their security problems. However, they might have difficulty
justifying new security equipment, such as firewalls or intrusion detection devices, if user
security training increases security (Paulson, 2002).
Because people are part of the system, failure to recognize and address the security
aspects of the end user can result in disaster (Bishop & Frincke, 2005; Katz, 2005).
Security risks associated with human behavior include the following:
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Social engineering—a hacking technique that exploits human trust or ignorance in
order to obtain information or gain access to information (Dean, 2003; Tucker,
2002).
Misuse of system and network—users consuming valuable computer resources
such as Internet connectivity or storage space for illegal purposes such as sharing
MP3 files or games. In addition to consuming costly resources, this behavior
potentially exposes systems to security threats and violates laws (Tucker, 2002).
Password guessing—users often choose passwords that are easy to guess or crack
(Dean, 2003; Tucker, 2002).
Physical access to bypass controls—users often leave documents and laptops
unsecured or set up their systems in insecure areas (Dean, 2003; Tucker, 2002).
System configuration—users often operate their computers with out-of-date
antivirus software, fail to install security patches, or open files without checking
for viruses, worms, and Trojan horses. These problems pose perhaps the greatest
security threat to a system (Reeder & Arshad, 2005).
Although organizations are providing security training for their users, these same
users continue to disable security settings in order to access unauthorized websites and
download unauthorized web applications, such as music and video files, behaviors that
increase the risk of security breaches (Balfanz, Durfee, Smetters, & Grinter, 2004; Cranor
& Garfinkel, 2004). Smith (2003) stated that younger users who had grown up with
computers perceived security as an obstacle they had to work around. For them,
information security is often considered inconvenient, not only for the end users, but also
for the system administrators and application developers as well (West, 2008). Most
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users will often sacrifice security and privacy for convenience while most network
managers will willingly sacrifice speed for security or vice versa, depending on the
priority of the user or organization (Jungck & Shim, 2004; Van Dyke, 2007). Other
factors that influence user behavior towards security include perceptions, understanding,
and trust (Gross & Rosson, 2007a). Cyber attacks such as social engineering can also
influence user actions (West, 2008).
How people perceive security risks guides their actions, with most users believing
that they and their organizations are safe from security threats (Havana & Roning, 2004;
West, 2008) because a good security program is transparent. Unless the system crashes,
there are no indicators that the system is secure (Paulson, 2002; West, 2008).
Furthermore, if there are no visible threats, most users believe they are not at risk (West,
2008). These assumptions create a mindset with both managers and users who believe
that, if a cyber attack has not yet happened, it is unlikely to happen in the future
(Stefanek, 2002).
Although users claim that security and privacy are important to them when online,
these same users seem to be at ease in disclosing personal information in order to gain
additional products or services when registering for online accounts (Conti & Sobiesk,
2007). These users believe that they are less vulnerable to security risks because they
have nothing of interest on their system that anyone would want to steal (Havana &
Roning, 2004; West, 2008). These inconsistencies between professing privacy concerns
and engaging in risky behavior while on the Internet may be more a consequence of
ignorance rather than irrationality (Van Dyke, 2007). Research has indicated that, despite
having little to no formal training in computer security, most users feel relatively
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comfortable in their ability to protect themselves from viruses, computer crashes, and
password violations (Aytes & Connolly, 2004; West, 2008). Users have also been known
to perform low-level, insecure behavior such as password sharing, creating and using
weak passwords that can be easily guessed, opening e-mail attachments without checking
for viruses, and so forth without any attacks on their systems (Aytes & Connolly, 2004).
Because these actions are not discouraged and, in some cases, are rewarded because they
are seen as helpful (in cases of sharing passwords) or as saving time by not scanning for
viruses, they can further encourage inappropriate actions or justify the negative attitude
towards security (Aytes & Connolly, 2004).
In an organizational setting, user behavior is also influenced by different levels of
culture, ranging from professional and organizational levels to the group level. That is,
for a specific project, the culture of the project team will dominate the behavior and
practices of the individual (Karahanna, Evaristo & Srite, 2005). Other impacts to security
behavior include users’ limited capacity for information processing and routinely
performing multiple tasks at once (West, 2008). As a result, few tasks or decisions
receive full attention at any given time, and people tend to favor quick decisions based on
learned rules and heuristics (West, 2008). Because of this tendency, users often fail to
recognize security risks because they do not understand the technology or the risks so
basically believe that they are at less risk than others (Van Dyke, 2007; West, 2008). The
average user also faces a dilemma when making security decisions. That is, users
generally lack both the motivation and technical knowledge to make informed decisions
on their own (Ohaya, 2006; Stoll et al., 2008; West, 2008) because they do not have the
underlying knowledge of how operating systems, e-mail, and websites work (Ohaya,

25
2006). In addition, the mechanisms for encryption, authentication, and authorization can
be difficult for the user to understand and use (West, 2008). Setting up security is still
much too complicated for the common user (Lampson, 2004).
Furthermore, studies have indicated that the more complex the security mechanism,
the less it is used (West, 2008). For this reason, nonacceptance of security tools is
recognized as a major problem facing the security community (West, 2008). As a result,
improper perceptions about security and poor or even moderate attitudes towards security
often lead to very poor protection (West, 2008). The most elegant and intuitively
designed interface does not improve security if users ignore warnings, choose poor
settings, or unintentionally subvert corporate policies (West, 2008). Simply being aware
of security threats and vulnerabilities and having the knowledge and ability to mitigate
these security risks does not guarantee any action will be taken by the user (West, 2008).
Because people’s morals and ethics vary from person to person, relying on the employee
to do what is right or ethical is never the answer (Carroll, 2006). To ensure that an
employee will make the right decision when confronted with a security threat, that
employee needs to participate in a security education program (Boyce & Jennings, 2002).

Security Awareness and Training
To counter the security risks posed by inappropriate user action, security
professionals propose security awareness and training programs for users (Aytes &
Connolly, 2004; Blyth & Kovacich, 2006; North et al., 2007). Awareness programs
consist of newsletters, posters, flyers, and lectures while training programs are more
involved and may include case studies and hands-on training (Crossler & Belanger,
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2006). The primary goal of security-training programs is to make the user aware of the
various security risks and how they could affect the organization (Aytes & Connolly,
2004). Prior to conducting any security training, an organization security manager must
assess the organization’s state of security awareness (Blyth & Kovacich, 2006). Tucker
(2002) reported that a simple method for assessing security awareness is for the security
manager to consider whether a typical employee observing another employee doing
something that might be inappropriate be able to answer the following three questions:
Would this employee know whether the activity was wrong?
Would this employee choose to report the misuse of the system?
Would this employee know how to report the incident?
These questions strike at the heart of security awareness. Users must understand and
recognize not only unacceptable behavior but also common threats and vulnerabilities
(Blyth & Kovacich, 2006; Conti & Sobiesk, 2007; Tucker, 2002). Users must know
when not to execute a dangerous e-mail attachment or install a software patch, and they
must know how to take appropriate action when confronted with a threat (Aytes &
Connolly, 2004).
A good information security-awareness program is more than simply ensuring that
everyone knows and obeys the security rules (e.g., rules for user behavior, policies, and
procedures), it involves providing the reason behind the security rules in order for users
to make sound security decisions in the absence of specific guidance (Boyce & Jennings,
2002). Raising the user level of security awareness will provide that user with the
knowledge to be able to recognize and prevent inappropriate actions (Al-Hamdani, 2006).
Security awareness should help curtail inappropriate user behavior, prevent the user from
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creating system security vulnerabilities, and protect the user from becoming the next
victim of a cyber attack (Blyth & Kovacich, 2006; Hazari, 2005).
Besides developing information security awareness programs, organizations must
continually assess the education and training needs of their users and security personnel
(Dhillion & Hentea, 2005). Continuing education and refresher training is very important
in keeping security personnel and users up-to-date on new applications, current security
threats, regulations, and policies (Dhillion & Hentea, 2005; Lipinski, Cooper, Cook, &
Orndorff, 2007). The biggest hindrance in implementing any security awareness and
training program is in obtaining the participants’ acceptance (Bradley & Lee, 2007).
Even if security training is perceived as useful, it will only be accepted if it is also
perceived as easy to learn and use (Bradley & Lee, 2007). Unfortunately, these security
efforts and training programs are designed largely in the absence of reliable knowledge
about the users’ behavior that this training is seeking to enhance or change (Aytes &
Connolly, 2004). Therefore, before these security awareness and training programs can
be implemented, organizations need to assess the security behavior of individual users.
In addition, to overcome the inappropriate actions of users, organizations need to
embrace change related to their current security strategies even though organizations and
users are renowned for their resistance to change (Ramim & Levy, 2006).

Summary of What Is Known and Unknown in Research Literature
Current literature on user security has received little attention from security
researchers because information security is still considered a technical discipline
(Siponen & Oinas-Kukkonen, 2007). Kostakos and O’Neill (2008) stated that traditional
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HCI literature has considered the human-in-the-loop security issues as a design problem
in need of appropriate interfaces, interactions, and policies. However, Bishop and
Frincke (2005) stated that, without understanding something about how people interact
with security, it is easy to blame users for security breaches. Articles on user behaviors
regarding system security have indicated that individuals are still engaging in
inappropriate security behavior. These inappropriate actions include the following:
security personnel who are security certified tend to violate security procedures 50%
more than their noncertified counterparts (Suchan, 2003); college students majoring in
technical curriculums admitted to violating security procedures more than students not
majoring in technical curriculums (North et al., 2006, 2007); and the faculty and staff at
Armstrong Atlantic State University performed only minimum security practices to
safeguard their information, including not using antivirus software, not backing up data,
not using strong passwords, and not locking their systems when they were left alone
(Katz, 2005).
Research on inappropriate user action regarding online protection, especially
protection against phishing attacks, includes the following. Reeder and Arshad (2005)
reported that 75% of the participants still fell victim to a mimicked phishing attack even
though the researchers provided clues that it was an email scam. In addition,
Kumaraguru et al. (2007) reported that participants still fell victim to a phishing attack
even though they had received training and warnings about such attacks. Engelman,
Cranor, and Hong (2008) reported that users heeded security warnings; however, if the
user did not understand what a phishing attack was, that user would not pay attention to
the security warning. Further, Wu, Miller, and Garfinkel (2006) reported that security
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toolbars failed to prevent users from being spoofed by phishing attacks because users
failed to respond to security toolbars. Finally, Dhamija, Tygar, and Hearst (2006)
reported that standard security indicators were not effective for most users.
Furthermore, research has also been conducted on inappropriate user action regarding
system authentication. Sasamoto, Christin, and Hayashi (2008) reported that users failed
to conceal their actions when authenticating, increasing the risk in becoming a victim to
shoulder surfing, and Moncur and Leplatre (2007) reported that some participants
admitted to writing down their passwords or sharing their passwords. Toomim, Zhang,
Fogarty, and Landay (2008) investigated shared access control using photo sharing and
reported that vulnerabilities in guessing the shared password occurred. Finally,
Jakobsson, Stolterman, Wetzel, and Yang (2008) proposed a preference-based
authentication approach with an interactive session to help users remember their
passwords; however, during testing, an adaptive robot was successful in guessing the
answers to the questions.
In investigating the Threat, Awareness, Learning, and Control (TALC) system, which
draws graffiti on the computer background wallpaper to denote potential vulnerabilities,
Sankarapandian, Little, and Edwards (2008) reported that four out of seven users felt that
using TALC had improved their ability to protect their computer. Furthermore, Stoll et
al. (2008) reported, concerning a security decision tool called Sesame report, that it
helped users make better security decisions. In addition, Herzog and Shahmehri (2007)
investigated existing user help applications, techniques, and built-in security and reported
that these applications may still be failures because actual implementation often
disregarded usability guidelines. Finally, Gaw, Felten, and Fernandez-Kelly (2006)
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report that participants felt paranoid when using an encrypted e-mail system and
indicated that using encrypted e-mail messages was annoying and less efficient than
sending plain old text e-mails messages.

Contribution of this Study
The goal of this study was to assess users’ security behaviors in relation to their
security awareness. The results of this study provide researchers and security personnel
in the private, academic, and federal community with the following:
A survey instrument to assess the everyday security behaviors and practices of
working professionals;
A demographic baseline on the security behaviors and practices of working
professionals by gender, age, education, and occupation;
An extension to the security behaviors and practices baseline developed by Katz
(2005), from which further research can be conducted.

Summary
The decentralization of computers along with rising Internet usage, escalating
software upgrades, rapid introduction of new technologies, and an increasing number of
cyber attacks has overwhelmed security personnel (Arce, 2003; Raghavan et al., 2008).
Because of these attacks, users are now responsible for their systems security or
information assurance. This shift of responsibility is introducing a new set of security
problems, specifically, the internal security threat caused by the inappropriate actions of
users. Insider threats may not occur as frequently as external attacks, but they have a
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higher rate of success, can go undetected, and pose a greater risk than external attacks
(Chinchani et al., 2005). Insider threats can be classified into two categories: the
intentional and the unintentional (Carroll, 2006). The intentional security threat occurs
when a party or trusted person within the organization knowingly sets out to cause
damage or loss of data to a system (Blyth & Kovacich, 2006). The unintentional security
threat occurs when a trusted person within the organization causes damage, loss of data,
or loss of service without direct intent (Blyth & Kovacich, 2006). These internal threats
continue to be a significant security challenge within any organization.
Another challenge facing the security community is the gap of security knowledge
that exists between security personnel and hackers. Because of this knowledge gap,
hackers are creating cyber attacks faster than security personnel can react to them. In
addition to these internal security challenges, hackers have shifted the focus of their
attacks to users. Besides the user, organizations also seem to be unprepared to deal with
such cyber attacks. One way to lessen the impact of these security challenges is through
information assurance training. Information security training not only raises users’
awareness level, but also provides users with the ability to recognize and prevent any
inappropriate actions. However, prior to conducting any security training, an
organization security manager must assess the organizations state of security awareness
(Blyth & Kovacich, 2006).
Current literature on user security has received little attention from security
researchers because information security is still considered a technical discipline
(Siponen & Oinas-Kukkonen, 2007). For example, Kostakos and O’Neill (2008) stated
that traditional HCI literature has considered the human-in-the-loop security issues as a
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design problem in need of appropriate interfaces, interactions, and policies. However,
Bishop and Frincke (2005) stated that, without understanding how people interact with
security, it is easy to blame users for security breaches. Finally, articles on users’
behaviors regarding system security have indicated that individuals are still performing
inappropriate security behavior.
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Chapter 3
Methodology

This chapter presents the methodology used for this research study. The goal of this
study was to assess the security behaviors and practices of the working professional.
Research can use a quantitative or a qualitative approach (Nardi, 2003; Creswell, 2003).
The quantitative approach employs strategies of inquiry, such as experiments and surveys
that collect data on predetermined instruments that yield statistical data (Creswell, 2003).
The qualitative approach employs strategies of inquiry, such as narratives,
phenomenology, or case studies that collect open-ended, emerging data with the primary
intent of developing themes from the data (Creswell, 2003). Nardi (2003) stated that the
use of a quantitative research instrument is the best approach for research intended to
describe human behavior. The more efficient quantitative method for measuring attitude
and behavior is to use a closed-ended questionnaire (Nardi, 2003). Although the closedended questionnaire allows for fewer variations in participants’ responses, it is easier and
quicker for the participants to complete (Nardi, 2003). Self-administered questionnaires
are best designed for studying behavior that may be difficult for people to tell someone
else about face-to-face (Nardi, 2003). In addition, the anonymity of self-administered
questionnaires permits participants to be more candid, but researchers do not always
know whether the participants are answering the questions honestly (Nardi, 2003).
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Research Method Employed
The main purpose of this study was to assess the security behaviors and practices of
the common system user. Previous research in assessing the security behavior of a user
was conducted by Katz (2005). To measure the participants’ security behavior, Katz
used a 5-point Likert scale self-administered, closed-ended quantitative questionnaire.
Because this study was a continuation of the work conducted by Katz, permission was
obtained from Katz to adapt his methodology (see Appendix B). This adaptation was
vital to maintaining the integrity of the baseline developed and helped establish a viable
launching point for this study. The adaptation included replacing the physical security
questions with questions regarding security training. Because users’ behaviors can be
influenced by their demographic groups, the adaptation also included examining the
influence on the security behavior of four demographic variables: gender, age, education,
and occupation. Like Katz, this study used a 5-point Likert scale in a self-administered,
closed-ended questionnaire. The survey instrument was designed in two sections: The
demographic section used a binary scale to gather the participants’ demographic data, and
the security section used the 5-point Likert scale to measure the participants’ security
behaviors. Details of the study’s methodology are provided in the following sections.

Participants
The participants for this study were working professionals from the General Dynamic
and Program Manager Advanced Amphibious Assault (GD & PM AAA) Facility in
Woodbridge, Virginia. PM AAA is no different from any other organization that is
responsible for securing information ranging from organizationally sensitive information
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to personnel evaluations. The participants from PM AAA Office were selected because
PM AAA is not only a research and development facility but also a paperless
environment. Because the employees use computers on a daily basis, their computer
skills and security knowledge should be good. The total population at the PM AAA
Office was 288.

Privacy Protection
Research involving human subjects needs to have a research plan reviewed by the
Institutional Review Board (IRB) of the researcher’s institution and the participating
organization’s IRB or designated authority (Creswell, 2003). These IRB committees
exist because of federal regulations that provide for the protection of human rights
against violations (Creswell, 2003). To resolve any ethical issues concerning human
rights violations and to protect the participants’ privacy and anonymity, the survey was
submitted to the PM AAA Operations Officer, who reviewed the survey and submitted it
to the Program Manager (PM) for approval (see Appendix C). After PM AAA approval
was received, the survey instrument was submitted to Nova Southeastern University
(NSU) IRB for approval (see Appendix D). Upon notification of NSU IRB approval, the
researcher conducted the survey.

Variables
Measuring behavior is normally accomplished through the use of a questionnaire that
measures the variables among the demographics (Nardi, 2003; Singh et al., 2007). The
variables for this study include an independent variable—the security behavior of a
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user—and a dependent variable—the security awareness level of a user. The independent
variable or security behavior by demographics was collected from the survey
questionnaire. The dependent variable or security awareness level was determined from
the tabulated results of the survey instrument.

Survey Instrument
The survey instrument was an adaptation of the questionnaire developed by Katz
(2005). To increase the response rate, the researcher limited the questions in each section
to one page (Kruck & Teer, 2008). The survey instrument consisted of (a) a cover sheet,
(b) a demographic section, and (c) a security section (see Appendix E).

Cover Sheet
The cover sheet included (a) a statement informing the participant that the survey was
for a doctoral dissertation, (b) a statement that all information collected would be
confidential, (c) a participation consent statement to inform the participant that the survey
complied with IRB requirements, (d) a statement that all information gathered would
remain anonymous, and (e) a thank you note for participating in the survey.

Demographic Section
The demographics section (Section 1) included (a) instruction on completing the
questionnaire and (b) questions that elicited the participant’s demographic data. Critical
in understanding human behavior is knowing how behavior varies across different groups
or demographics (Nardi, 2003) because a person’s behavior is influenced by cultures and
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groups that develop their own values and norms over time (Karahanna et al., 2005).
Collecting this information was important because earlier studies on the impact of such
demographics as age and gender on computer usage may no longer be accurate (Knight &
Pearson, 2005). According to Nardi (2003), questions about gender, race, age, income,
education, and occupation are typical of demographic information. Because a user’s
behavior can be influenced by his or her demographic group membership, this study
examined the influence of four demographic variables: gender, age, education, and
occupation. A cross-reference matrix of Section 1 (the demographic section) to the
survey instrument is provided in Table 1.
Table 1. Demographic Section (Section 1) Cross-Reference Matrix
Demographic
(Population)

Survey Question

Questionnaire
Number

Gender

Are you a female?

1

Age

Are you age 40 and over?

2

Education level

Are you a college graduate?

3

Occupation

Are you in a technical position?

4

To understand the participants’ security behaviors, this study compared the results of
the security questionnaire across the four demographics groups: gender (men vs. women),
age (older participants vs. younger participants), education (college graduates vs.
noncollege participants), and occupation (participants in technical positions vs. those in
nontechnical positions).
Concerning the first demographic group of gender, Zukowski and Brown (2007)
noted that women were more concerned about online security and privacy than their male
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counterparts. This study assessed the gender group with the following question: Are
female users more security aware?
In terms of the second demographic group, Zukowski and Brown (2007) stated that
older users are more concerned about online security and privacy than their younger
counterparts. For this study, older participants were defined as those aged 40 and over
while younger participants were those aged 39 and younger. This study assessed the age
group by seeking to answer the following question: Are users aged 40 and over more
security aware?
Concerning the third demographic group of education, Zukowski and Brown (2007)
indicated that individuals with lower levels of education may perform fewer online
actions because of having greater concern about security than their counterparts with
higher levels of education. For this study, lower levels of education were defined as not
having attended college while higher levels of education were defined as having
graduated from college. This study assessed the education group by answering the
following question: Are users with higher levels of education more security aware?
Considering the fourth demographic group of occupation, Suchan (2003) stated that
employees in technical positions or with technical backgrounds tended to violate or
bypass security procedures more than their nontechnical counterparts. For this study,
technical positions were defined as positions that required a college degree in engineering
or information technology while nontechnical positions were defined as positions that did
not require technical skills or abilities, such as logisticians and administrative personnel.
This study assessed the occupation group by answering the following question: Are users
in technical positions more security aware?

39

Security Section
The security section (Section 2) included (a) instruction on how to complete the
questionnaire and (b) questions to gather the participants’ security data. Security threats
caused by users’ inappropriate actions continue to be a significant security problem
within any organization (Andrews & Whittaker, 2004; Blyth & Kovacich, 2006). Users
must known when not to execute a dangerous e-mail attachment, when not to install
online software, and when and how to take appropriate action when confronted with
security threats (Aytes & Connolly, 2004). One way to lessen the impact of these
security challenges is through information assurance training. Information security
training not only raises user awareness levels but also provides users with the ability to
recognize and prevent any inappropriate actions. A user’s security awareness level was
defined as whether a user would know whether an activity was wrong, would choose to
report the misuse of the system, and would report a security incident. This section
assessed whether the participants had been performing the simple everyday practices and
behaviors necessary to avert insider threats. The security questionnaire was based on
three security domains: (a) security training, (b) essential security practices, and (c)
appropriate security actions. A cross-referenced matrix of the security section (Section 2)
to the survey instrument is provided in Table 2.
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Table 2. Security Section (Section 2) Cross-Reference Matrix
Survey Security
Awareness

Survey Question

Questionnaire
Number

Security Training

These questions ascertain the
individual’s security awareness training

1, 2

Essential Security
Practices

These questions ascertain the proper/
essential security practices

3, 4

Appropriate Security
Practices

These questions ascertain the proper
security behavior/actions

5, 6, 7

The security training domain was addressed through two questions (Questions 1 and
2) that measured the participants’ responses concerning security training and their ability
to report security threats or virus alerts. Boyce and Jennings (2002) noted that, to prevent
security threats, personnel need to participate in security training and know how to report
security threats; that is, they should always participate in training and always report a
security threat (Boyce & Jennings, 2002).
The essential security practices domain was investigated through two questions
(Question 3 and 4) that measured the participants’ responses concerning protecting their
unattended systems and scanning e-mail attachments for viruses. Boyce and Jennings
(2002) indicated that, to prevent unauthorized access, personnel need to protect their
unattended systems by using a screen lock and scanning email attachments; that is, they
should always secure their systems and scan attachments for viruses.
The appropriate security actions domain was addressed through three questions
(Questions 5, 6 and 7) that measured the participants’ responses concerning system
security settings, access to their systems, and web downloads. Boyce and Jennings
(2002) indicated that, to prevent unauthorized access, personnel need to disable the
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automated password feature, prevent other people from accessing their systems, and
avoid web downloading of applications; that is, they should never use the automated
password feature, never provide others access to their systems, and never download web
applications.
This entire section measured the participants’ security behavior in order to answer the
research question of whether there a relation between users’ security behaviors and their
levels of security awareness.

Measures
The survey instrument was designed in two sections having the following formats for
collecting and measuring data on the participants:
Demographic section (Section 1) used a binary (yes/no) format.
Security section (Section 2) used a 5-point Likert scale (Always, Sometimes,
Neutral, Seldom, and Never) to measure participants’ security behaviors.
The Likert scale is a common scaling technique used for closed-ended survey research
(Nardi, 2003). To complete the security questionnaire, participants were asked to place
an ―X‖ in the appropriate box to the right of each question. An example question from
Section 2 is shown in Table 3.
Table 3. Security Section Example Question
Always
1. Do you participate in security training?

Sometime

Neutral

Seldom

Never
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Data Collection
Data collection consisted of collecting the completed surveys and entering the data
into a computer. The PM AAA Operations Officer collected and safeguarded the
completed surveys (as indicated in Appendix C). Once collected, the responses were
reviewed for usability. Partially completed questionnaires were considered unusable
(Nardi, 2003). Responses from all usable questionnaires were entered in a Microsoft
Excel spreadsheet. The collected surveys were kept in a secure location during the time
the data were being entered. Afterward, the researcher destroyed all printed surveys.

Data Coding
The collected data were recorded in a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet. Because each
participant indicated a response with an ―X,‖ when the data were recorded in the
spreadsheet, the ―X‖ was replaced with a ―1‖ in order to tabulate all categorical data.

Format for Presenting the Results
Results of this study are presented in Chapter 4. Nardi (2004) stated that there are
several ways of presenting data, including frequency tables, graphs or tables, and
statistical significance. To determine statistical significance, social scientists have
generally accepted that, if the probability value, symbolized by the lowercase p, is less
than 5% (p < .05), the result is considered statistically significant (Nardi, 2003). For this
study, a probability value of less than 5% was used. The t test was used to determine the
statistical significance of the demographic data, and the Pearson chi-square was used to
determine the statistical significance of the population’s security data.

43

Resources Used
Resources required for this study included (a) a computer; (b) Microsoft Word for
developing the survey instrument; (c) Microsoft Excel for recording the data, creating the
frequency tables and bar graphs, and providing a statistical spreadsheet using the Excel
chi-square and t test formulas; (d) a printer; (e) Internet access; and (f) access to PM
AAA Intranet.

Summary
This chapter presented the methodology used for this study. The goal of the study
was to determine whether the employees at a mid-sized research and manufacturing
facility were engaging in proper information security behaviors and practices. Previous
research that assessed the security behaviors of users had been conducted by Katz (2005).
To measure the participants’ security behavior, Katz used a 5-point Likert scale on a selfadministered, closed-ended quantitative questionnaire. Because this study was a
continuation of the work conducted by Katz, permission was obtained from him to adapt
his methodology. This adaption was vital not only in maintaining the integrity of the
baseline developed but also in providing a viable launching point for this study. This
study’s adaptation included replacing the physical/location questions with questions
regarding security training. The demographic was expanded from faculty and staff to
four demographic groups: gender, age, education, and occupation. Like that of Katz, this
study used a self-administered, closed-ended questionnaire. The survey instrument used
a binary scale to gather the participants’ demographic data and a 5-point Likert scale to
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measure the participants’ security behaviors. The survey instrument was designed in
three parts: (a) a cover letter, (b) a demographic section, and (c) a security section. The
security questions were developed from three security domains: (a) security training, (b)
essential security practices, and (c) appropriate security actions. The results of the survey
are presented in Chapter 4, using frequency tables and bar graphs. The survey’s results
were analyzed using the following statistical tests: (a) demographic data were analyzed
with a t test and (b) security behavior data were analyzed with the Pearson chi-square
test. To determine whether the findings for both demographic groups and the participant
population were statistically significant, a probability of less than 5% (p < .05) was used.
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Chapter 4
Results

Background
This chapter presents the findings of this research study. The goal of this study was
to determine the participants’ behaviors and practices in information security. The study
used a self-administered, closed-ended questionnaire to collect data on the demographic
and research questions posed in the study. The findings are presented in frequency tables
and graphs. Frequency tables show how each participant responded or scored on a given
question (Nardi, 2003). Heiman (2006) stated that the most common way to organize
scores is to create a simple frequency distribution, which shows the number of times each
score occurs in a set of data. For this study, the frequency for each response or score is
listed in raw numbers of occurrence and in percentages relative to the number of total
responses (Nardi, 2003). According to Heiman (2006), presenting data in a graph or
table is important for two reasons:
First, it answers questions about the different scores that occurred in the data in an
organized manner.
Second, such presentations of data provide the building blocks for other
descriptive and inferential statistics.
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Findings
The survey instrument was designed in two sections: the first section focused on
gathering the participants’ demographic data while the second section focused on
gathering information on the participants’ security behaviors and practices. A total of
288 employees received the survey, and 92 returned the survey, with 87 or 30%
completing the survey. The data in this study were taken from the 87 completed surveys.
Responses to the survey were recorded and analyzed using a t test to determine the
statistical significance between the demographic groups and a Pearson chi-square to
determine the statistical significance of the participant’s security responses.

Demographics
This section presents the participants’ responses to the survey’s demographic
questions. A binary (yes/no) scale was used to record the participants’ responses. Table
4 shows the participants’ responses in frequency and percentages. Figure 1 is a bar graph
of the participants’ responses in percentages. The results in terms of demographics are as
follows:
Gender: 77% of the participants indicated they were male.
Age: 60.9% of the participants indicated they were age 40 or over.
Education: 74.7% of the participants indicated they had attended college.
Occupation: 64.4% of the participants indicated they were in a technical position.
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Table 4. Demographic Data
Frequency

Demographic

Yes

No

Yes

No

1. Are you a female?

20

67

23.0

77.0

2. Are you age 40 and over?

53

34

60.9

39.1

3. Are you a college graduate?

65

22

74.7

25.3

4. Are you in a technical position?

56

31

64.4

35.6

Frequency (%)

Questions

Percent

90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
F

M

40+

Gender

39Age

COL

NCOL

Education

TEC

NTEC

Occupation

Demographics
Legend:
F = Female, M = Male, 40+ = Age 40 & over, 39- = Age 39 & under, COL = College, NCOL
= No College, TEC = Technical, NTEC = Nontechnical

Figure 1. Demographic data.

Security Survey
This section presents the participants’ responses to the survey’s security questions. A
5-point Likert scale was used to record the participants’ responses as shown in Tables 5
to 11.
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Security Question 1
Table 5 presents the participants’ responses to Security Question 1: Do you
participate in security training? According to the results, a majority (70.1%) of the
sample population always participated in security training. The remaining responses
included 11.5% indicating they sometimes participated in security training, 10.3%
indicating they seldom participated in security training, 2.3% indicated they never
participated in security training, and 5.7% remained neutral.

Table 5. Responses to Security Question 1
Likert scale

Frequency

Percent

Always

61

70.1

Sometimes

10

11.5

Neutral

5

5.7

Seldom

9

10.3

Never

2

2.3

Total

87

100.0

Security Question 2
Table 6 presents the participants’ responses to Security Question 2: Do you know
who to contact if you get a virus alert? According to the results, a majority (90.8%) of
the sample population always knew who to contact if a security problem occurred. The
remaining responses included 3.4% sometimes knowing who to contact, 3.4% never
knowing who to contact, and 2.3% remained neutral concerning knowing who to contact
if a security problem occurred.
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Table 6. Responses to Security Question 2
Likert scale

Frequency

Percent

79

90.8

Sometimes

3

3.4

Neutral

2

2.3

Seldom

0

0.0

Never

3

3.4

Total

87

100.0

Always

Security Question 3
Table 7 presents the participants’ responses to Security Question 3: Do you lock your
screen or use a screen saver when you leave your computer? According to the results, a
majority (65.5%) of the sample population always locked or used a screen saver when
they left their computers. The remaining responses included 29.9% indicating they
sometimes locked their screens, 2.3% indicating they seldom locked their screen, 1.1%
indicating they never locked their screens, and 1.1% remaining neutral concerning
locking their screens or using a screen saver when leaving their computers.
Table 7. Responses to Security Question 3
Likert scale

Frequency

Percent

Always

57

65.5

Sometimes

26

29.9

Neutral

1

1.1

Seldom

2

2.3

Never

1

1.1

Total

87

100.0
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Security Question 4
Table 8 presents the participants’ responses to Security Question 4: Do you scan all email attachments for viruses? According to the results, under half (40.2%) of the sample
population always scanned their e-mail attachments for viruses. The remaining responses
included 10.3% indicating they sometimes scanned their e-mail attachments, 13.8%
indicating they seldom scanned their e-mail attachments, 23% indicating they never
scanned their e-mail attachments, and 12.6% remaining neutral concerning scanning their
e-mail attachments for viruses.
Table 8. Responses to Security Question 4
Likert scale

Frequency

Percent

35

40.2

9

10.3

Neutral

11

12.6

Seldom

12

13.8

Never

20

23.0

Total

87

100.0

Always
Sometimes

Security Question 5
Table 9 presents the participants’ responses to Security Question 5: Do you use the
automatic save/remember password feature on your computer? This question was
designed with a negative or never response. According to the results, under half (44.8%)
of the sample population never used the automatic save/remember password feature. The
remaining responses included 10.3% indicating they always used the save/remember
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password feature, 21.8% indicating they sometimes used the save/remember password
feature, 17.2% indicating they seldom used the save/remember password feature, and
5.7% remained neutral concerning using the automatic save/remember password feature.
Table 9. Responses to Security Question 5
Likert scale

Frequency

Percent

9

10.3

19

21.8

Neutral

5

5.7

Seldom

15

17.2

Never

39

44.8

Total

87

100.0

Always
Sometimes

Security Question 6
Table 10 presents the participants’ responses to Security Question 6: Do other people
have access or use of your computer? This question was designed with a negative or
never response. According to the results, under half (46%) of the sample population
never let other people have access to or use their computers. The remaining responses
included 8% indicating they always let other people have access to or use of their
computers, 18.4% indicating they sometimes let other people have access to or use of
their computers, 20.7% indicating they seldom let other people have access to or use of
their computers, and 6.9% remaining neutral concerning letting other people have access
to or use of their computers.
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Table 10. Responses to Security Question 6
Likert scale

Frequency

Percent

7

8.0

16

18.4

Neutral

6

6.9

Seldom

18

20.7

Never

40

46.0

Total

87

100.0

Always
Sometimes

Security Question 7
Table 11 presents the participants’ responses to Security Question 7: Do you
download anything from the web (e.g., applications, upgrades, music, video clips, etc.)?
This question was designed with a negative or never response. According to the results,
under half (48.3%) of the sample population never downloaded anything from the web.
The remaining responses included 23% indicating they sometimes downloaded from the
web, 27.6% indicating they seldom downloaded from the web, and 1.1% remained
neutral concerning downloading from the web.
Table 11. Responses to Security Question 7
Likert scale

Frequency

Percent

0

0.0

20

23.0

Neutral

1

1.1

Seldom

24

27.6

Never

42

48.3

Total

87

100.0

Always
Sometimes
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Analysis of Survey Questions
This section addresses the study’s four demographic questions (DQ) and the research
question (RQ). The survey questions were as follows:
DQ1: Are female users more security aware?
DQ2: Are users age 40 and over more security aware?
DQ3: Are users with higher levels of education more security aware?
DQ4: Are users in technical positions more security aware?
RQ:

Is there a relationship between users’ security behaviors and their levels of
security awareness?

Data from the Likert scales can be simplified by either combining the response
categories or reducing the results into nominal categories such as agree/disagree (Waikar
& Huynh, 2008). Furthermore, Casper and Floyd (2009) indicated that the end point can
be used as summated rating scales. For this study, the data from the Likert scales were
simplified by reducing the following: (a) questions 1 through 4 used the always end point
and (b) questions 5 through 7 used the never end point. The survey results were analyzed
using the following statistical tests: (a) for demographic data, the t test was used, and (b)
for security data, the Pearson chi-square test was used. To determine whether the
findings for both the demographics and population were statistically significant, a
probability of less than 5% (p < .05) was used.
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Demographic Question 1 Gender Group
This section addressed the gender question: Are female users more security aware?
The results of the security questionnaire by gender are presented in frequency and
percentages in Table 12. The findings indicate how each group responded to each of the
security questions. To address the gender question, the data were statistically analyzed
using Microsoft’s Excel TTEST (see Table 13).
Table 12. Security Responses by Gender
Security
questions

Frequency

Percent

F
(n = 20)

M
(n = 67)

F

M

Q1

14

47

70.0

70.1

Q2

18

61

90.0

91.0

Q3

13

44

65.0

65.7

Q4

10

25

50.0

37.3

Q5

9

30

45.0

44.9

Q6

7

33

35.0

49.3

Q7

12

30

60.0

44.8

Note. The percentage is the frequency divided by the total participants multiplied by
100 (e.g., Q1 F = 14/20 x 100, M = 47/67 x 100).
F = female; M = male.

Results of the t test determined that the findings were statistically significant, thereby
answering the question that female participants were more security aware than their male
counterparts, as indicated in Table 13. In addition to answering the demographic
question, the responses on the three security domains were analyzed to better understand
where the security issues reside. Results of two of the three security domains, security
training and appropriate security practices, were statistically significant, as shown in
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Table 13. Female participants were overall more security aware; however, the results for
the security domains indicate that males were more security aware in regards to security
training while females were more security aware in regards to appropriate security
practices. The findings also indicated that the participants’ essential security practices
and appropriate security practices were under 58%, indicating that each gender group had
poor security practices.
Table 13. Security Analysis by Gender
Frequency
Security domains
F
M
(n = 20) (n = 67)
11.9
38.6
Gender total

Percent
F
M

t test
df

Sig.

59.3

57.6

6

8.59E-05*

Security training

16.0

54.0

80.0

80.6

1

0.01740*

Essential security practices

11.5

34.5

57.5

51.5

1

0.06962*

9.3

31.0

46.7

46.3

2

0.00013*

Appropriate security practices

Note. The percentage is the frequency divided by the total participants multiplied by 100.
F= female; M = male.
* p < .05 (one-tailed, two sample equal variance test).

Demographic Question 2 Age Group
This section addresses the age question: Are users age 40 and over more security
aware? The results of the security questionnaire by age are presented in frequency and
percentages in Table 14. The findings indicate how each group responded to each of the
security questions. To address the age question, the data were statistically analyzed using
Microsoft’s Excel TTEST (see Table 15).
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Table 14. Security Responses by Age
Security
questions

Frequency

Percent

40+
(n = 53)

< 40
(n = 34)

40+

< 40

Q1

39

22

73.6

64.7

Q2

48

31

90.6

91.2

Q3

34

23

64.2

67.6

Q4

20

15

37.7

44.1

Q5

22

17

41.5

50.0

Q6

20

20

37.7

58.8

Q7

25

17

47.2

50.0

Note. The percentage is the frequency divided by the total participants multiplied by
100.
40+ = age 40 and over; < 40 = age 39 and under.

Results of the t test determined that the findings were statistically significant, thereby
indicating that participants age 40 and over were not more security aware than their
younger counterparts, as shown in Table 15. In addition to the age question, the
responses to the three security domains were analyzed to better understand where the
security issues reside. The results indicated that only one of the three security domains,
appropriate security practices, was statistically significant, as shown in Table 15.
Participants age 39 and younger were overall more security aware, including in terms of
appropriate security practices. The findings also indicate that the participants’ essential
security practices and appropriate security practices was under 56%, indicating that each
age group had poor security practices.
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Table 15. Security Analysis by Age
Frequency
40+
< 40
(n = 53) (n = 34)
29.7
20.7

Security domains

Age total

t test

Percent
40+ < 40

df

Sig.

56.1

60.9

6

0.036*

Security training

43.5

26.5

82.1

77.9

1

0.058 *

Essential security practices

27.0

19.0

50.9

55.9

1

0.213 *

Appropriate security practices

22.3

18.0

42.1

52.9

2

0.035 *

Note. The percentage is the frequency divided by the total participants multiplied by 100.
40+ = age 40 and over; < 40 = age 39 and under.
* p < .05 (one-tailed, two sample equal variance test).

Demographic Question 3 Education Group
This section addresses the education question: Are users with higher levels of
education more security aware? The results of the security questionnaire by education
are presented in frequency and percentages in Table 16. The findings indicate how each
group responded to each of the security questions. To address the education question, the
data were statistically analyzed using Microsoft’s Excel TTEST, as shown in Table 17.
Table 16. Security Responses by Education
Security
questions

Frequency

Percent

COL

NCOL

COL

NCOL

(n = 65)

(n = 22)

Q1

45

16

69.2

72.7

Q2

59

20

90.8

90.0

Q3

40

17

61.5

77.3

Q4

25

10

38.5

45.5

Q5

24

15

36.9

68.2

Q6

33

7

50.8

31.8

Q7

30

12

46.2

54.5

Note. Percentage is the frequency divided by the total participants multiplied by 100.
COL = college; NCOL = no college.
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Results of the t test determined that the findings were statistically significant, thereby
answering the question of whether participants with higher levels of education were more
security aware than their noncollege counterparts (see Table 17). In addition to
answering the education question, the data for the three security domains were analyzed
to better understand where the security issues reside. The results indicate that two of the
three security domains, security training and appropriate security practices, were
statistically significant, as shown in Table 17. Noncollege participants were overall more
security aware, including in terms of the security domains of security training and
appropriate security practices. The findings also indicate that the participants’ essential
security practices and appropriate security practices were under 62%, indicating that each
education group had poor security practices.
Table 17. Security Analysis by Education
Frequency
Security domains
COL
NCOL
(n = 65) (n = 22)
36.6
13.9
Education total

t test

Percent
COL NCOL

df

Sig.

56.3

63.0

6

0.0006*

Security training

52.0

18.0

80.0

81.8

1

0.0214 *

Essential security practices

32.5

13.5

50.0

61.4

1

0.0742 *

Appropriate security practices

29.0

11.3

44.6

51.5

2

0.0037 *

Note. The percentage is the frequency divided by the total participants multiplied by 100.
COL = college; NCOL = no college.
* p < .05 (one-tailed, two sample equal variance test).

Demographic Question 4 Occupation Group
This section addresses the occupation question: Are users in a technical position more
security aware? The results of the security questionnaire by occupation are presented in
frequency and percentages in Table 18. The findings indicate how each group responded
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to each of the security questions. To address the occupation question, the data were
statistically analyzed using Microsoft’s Excel TTEST (see Table 19).
Table 18. Security Responses by Occupation
Security
questions

Frequency
TEC

NTEC

(n = 56)

(n = 31)

Q1

36

Q2

Percent
TEC

NTEC

25

64.3

80.6

53

25

94.6

83.9

Q3

36

21

64.3

67.7

Q4

22

13

39.3

41.9

Q5

25

14

44.6

45.2

Q6

21

19

37.5

61.3

Q7

25

17

44.6

54.8

Note. Percentage is the frequency divided by the total participants multiplied by 100.
TEC = technical position; NTEC = nontechnical position.

Results of the t test determined that the findings were statistically significant, thereby
answering the question of whether participants in technical positions were more security
aware than those in nontechnical positions (see Table 19). In addition to answering the
occupation question, the data for the three security domains were analyzed to better
understand where the security issues reside. The results indicate that only one of the
three security domains, appropriate security practices, was statistically significant, as
shown in Table 19. Participants in nontechnical positions were, overall, more security
aware, including in terms of appropriate security practices. The findings also indicate
that the participants’ essential security practices and appropriate security practices were
under 55%, indicating that each occupation group had poor security practices.
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Table 19. Security Analysis by Occupation
Security
Frequency
domains
TEC
NTEC
(n = 56) (n = 31)
31.1
19.3
Occupational total

t test

Percent
TEC NTEC

df

Sig.

55.6

62.2

6

0.0138*

Security training

44.5

25.5

79.5

82.3

1

0.0770 *

Essential security practices

29.0

17.0

51.8

54.8

1

0.1370 *

Appropriate security practices

23.7

16.7

42.3

53.8

2

0.0110 *

Note. The percentage is the frequency divided by the total participants multiplied by 100.
TEC = technical position; NTEC = nontechnical position.
* p < .05 (one-tailed, two sample equal variance test).

Research Question
This section addresses the study’s research question: Is there a relation between users’
security behaviors and their levels of security awareness? The results of the security
survey are presented in frequencies and percentages in Table 20. The findings indicate
how participants responded to each of the security questions. To address the research
question, the data were statistically analyzed using Microsoft Excel CHITEST (see Table
21).
Table 20. Security Responses by Population
Security
questions

Population
Frequency

Percent

Q1

61

70.1

Q2

79

90.8

Q3

57

65.5

Q4

35

40.2

Q5

39

44.8

Q6

40

46.0

Q7

42

48.3

Note. Percentage is frequency divided by total participants multiplied
by 100.
N = 87.
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Results of the chi-square test determined that the findings were statistically
significant, thereby answering the research question of whether there is a relation
between users’ security behaviors and their levels of security awareness (see Table 21).
In addition to answering the research question, the data for the three security domains
were analyzed to better understand where the security issues reside. The results indicate
that only one of the three security domains, essential security practices, was statistically
significant, as shown in Table 21. The findings also indicate that the participants’
essential security practices and appropriate security practices were under 55%, indicating
that the sample population had poor security practices.
Table 21. Security Analysis by Population
Security domains

Population

Chi-square test

Frequency

Percent

df

Sig.

Participant total

50.4

58.0

6

3.7E-05

Security training

70.0

80.5

1

0.1282 *

Essential security practices

46.0

52.9

1

0.0218 *

Appropriate security practices

40.3

46.4

2

0.9438 *

Note. The percentage is the frequency divided by the total participants multiplied by 100.
N = 87.
* p < .05.

Security Questions Range
This section presents the security results by the highest and lowest scores for each
demographic group and total population (see Table 22). A break-down by security
responses was conducted in order to understand where the security issues lay according
to the sample population. Questions with high responses indicate strong security
behaviors and practices while low responses indicate weak security behaviors and
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practices. The findings indicate (see Table 22) that only one question received a
consistently high response rate for each demographic group and the total population: Do
you know who to contact if you get a virus alert? The results indicate that the
participants had strong security behaviors and practices in regards to security training
because they knew whom to contact if their systems had a security warning/alert. In
addition, the findings indicate that the lowest response rate was shared among three
security questions: (a) Question 4: Do you scan all email attachments for viruses? (b)
Question 6: Do other people have access or use of your computer? (c) Question 5: Do
you use the automatic save/remember password feature on your computer? (See Table
22.) The results indicate that the participants had weak security behaviors and practices
in terms of scanning email attachments for viruses, allowing others access to or use of
their systems, and using the system stored or saved password feature.

Summary
This chapter presented the results of this study. The goal was to measure the security
behaviors of the sample population in order to determine the participants’ security
awareness levels. The data for this study were taken from 87 surveys completed by the
sample population. The survey responses were used to address the study’s four
demographic questions (DQ) and its research question (RQ): (a) DQ1: Are female users
more security aware? (b) DQ2: Are users age 40 and over more security aware? (c)
DQ3: Are users with higher levels of education more security aware? (d) DQ4: Are users
in technical positions more security aware? (e) RQ: Is there a relation between users’
security behaviors and their levels of security awareness?
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Table 22. Security Questions Range
Demographic
High range
Group
SEC-Q
Percent

Low range
SEC-Q

Percent

Gender
F

Q-2

91.0

Q-4

37.3

M

Q-2

90.0

Q-6

35.0

40+

Q-2

90.6

* Q-4/Q-6

37.7

< 40

Q-2

91.2

Q-4

44.1

COL

Q-2

90.8

Q-5

36.9

NCOL

Q-2

90.9

Q-6

31.8

TEC

Q-2

94.6

Q-6

37.5

NTEC

Q-2

83.9

Q-4

41.9

Population

Q-2

90.8

Q-4

40.2

Age

Education

Occupation

F = female, M = male; 40+ = age 40 and over, > 40 = age 39 and under; COL = college, NCOL = No
college; TEC = technical position, NTEC = nontechnical position.
* Questions that had the same responses.

To answer the study’s questions the results were analyzed using the following
statistical tests: (a) the t test for the demographic data, and (b) the Pearson chi-square test
for the security behavior data. To determine whether the findings for both the
demographics and population were statistically significant, a probability of less than 5%
(p < .05) was used. The results determined the following: (a) DQ1 findings were
statistically significant, thereby answering the question of whether female participants
were more security aware than their male counterparts. (b) DQ2 findings were
statistically significant, thereby answering the question of whether participants age 40
and over were more security aware than their younger counterparts. (c) DQ3 findings
were statistically significant, thereby answering the question of whether participants with
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higher levels of education were more security aware than their noncollege counterparts.
(d) DQ4 findings were statistically significant, thereby answering the question of whether
participants in technical positions were more security aware than their nontechnical
counterparts. (e) RQ findings were statistically significant, thereby answering the
research question of whether there is a relation between users’ security behaviors and
their levels of security awareness.
The study also compared the security results by the highest and lowest scores for each
demographic group and total population. The findings indicate that one question,
Question 2, consistently had a high response rate by each demographic group and the
total population: Do you know who to contact if you get a virus alert? The results
determined that the participants had strong security behaviors and practices in regards to
security training because they knew who to contact if their systems displayed a security
warning/alert. In addition, the findings indicate that the lowest response rate was shared
across three security questions: (a) Q4 Do you scan all email attachments for viruses? (b)
Q6 Do other people have access or use of your computer? (c) Q5 Do you use the
automatic save/remember password feature on your computer? The results determined
that the participants had weak security behaviors and practices in regards to scanning
email attachments for viruses, allowing others access to or use of their systems, and using
the system stored/saved password feature.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions, Implications, Recommendations, and Summary

Conclusion
The goal of this study was to determine whether employees were engaging in proper
information security behavior and practices. Doing so was accomplished by measuring
participants’ security behaviors and practices using a 5-point Likert scale in a selfadministered, closed-ended, quantitative questionnaire. The sample population consisted
of working professionals at a mid-sized research and manufacturing facility in northern
Virginia. The response rate for this study was 30%. The participants’ responses were
used to answer the study’s four demographic questions and the research question. The
data were analyzed using the following statistical analysis tools: Demographic data were
analyzed using a t test, and population security data were analyzed using the Pearson chisquare. To determine whether the findings were statistically significant for both the
demographic groups and the entire population, a probability of less than 5% (p < .05) was
used.
The first demographic question was as follows: Are female users more security
aware? The results were statistically significant, indicating that females were more
security aware than their male counterparts. To better understand where the security
issues resided, the results were analyzed according to the three security domains. The
findings indicated that responses for two of the three security domains were statistically
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significant: security training and appropriate security practices. Although female
participants were generally more security aware, results by the security domains indicated
that male participants were more security aware in regards to security training while
female participants were more security aware in regards to appropriate security practices.
The second demographic question was as follows: Are users age 40 and over more
security aware? The results were statistically significant, indicating that participants age
39 and younger were more security aware than their counterparts age 40 and over. To
better understand where the security issues resided, the results were analyzed according
to the three security domains. The findings indicated that the responses for only one of
the three security domains were statistically significant: appropriate security practices.
Younger participants were more security aware not only in general but also in the
security domain.
The third demographic question was the following: Are users with higher levels of
education more security aware? The results were statistically significant, indicating that
participants who did not attend college (noncollege) were more security aware than their
higher educated counterparts. To better understand where the security issues resided, the
results were analyzed according to the three security domains. The findings indicated
that responses concerning two of the three security domains were statistically significant:
security training and appropriate security practices. Noncollege participants were more
security aware in general and, specifically, in those two security domains than those
without higher education.
The fourth demographic question was as follows: Are users in a technical position
more security aware? The results were statistically significant, indicating that
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participants in nontechnical positions were more security aware than their counterparts in
technical positions. To better understand where the security issues resided, the results
were analyzed according to the three security domains. The findings indicated that only
one of the three security domains was statistically significant: appropriate security
practices.
The following research question guided this study: Is there a relation between users’
security behaviors and their levels of security awareness? The results were statistically
significant, indicating that a relation exists between users’ security behaviors and their
levels of security awareness.
In order to understand where the differences among security issues lay for the total
population, the results were reviewed according to security responses. This review
resulted in identifying the highest and lowest scores for each demographic group and the
total population. The security question receiving the highest responses from each
demographic group and the total population was Question 2: Do you know who to
contact if you get a virus alert? The responses indicated that the participants know who
to contact if they receive a virus alert. Three security questions received the lowest
responses from each demographic group and the total population: (a) Question 4: Do you
scan all email attachments for viruses? (b) Question 6: Do other people have access or
use of your computer? (c) Question 5: Do you use the automatic save/remember
password feature on your computer? These results indicated that the participants had
weak security behaviors and practices in regards to scanning email attachments, allowing
others to have access to their systems, and using the stored/saved password feature on
their system.
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Implications
This study has a number of implications concerning individuals’ security practices
and behaviors. First, results of the survey indicated that younger participants were more
security aware than their older counterparts. This finding challenges the results of the
literature review that older individuals are more concerned about security than their
younger counterparts. Second, results for the research question indicated that a relation
exists between individuals’ security behaviors and their levels of security awareness;
however, the overall response rate of the sample population was 58%, indicating that
42% of the population engages in inappropriate security practices and behaviors.
Furthermore, the low responses for the security questions indicated the following: (a)
40.2% of the participants always scanned their email attachments for viruses while 58.2%
do not, making their systems vulnerable to a virus attack; (b) 40.6% of the participants
never allowed others access to their system while 59.4% allowed others access to their
system, making their systems or the data on their systems vulnerable to compromise; and
(c) 44.8% of the participants never used the automatic/save password feature while
55.2% used the feature, leaving their systems’ passwords vulnerable to being
compromised. These results indicate that the participants were either ignoring their
training by engaging in poor security practices or the security training provided did not
raise their security awareness level enough to prevent such poor practices.
The results of this study will enhance the existing body of security knowledge by
providing the security community with a better understanding of individuals’ security
practices and behaviors. These results could be used in developing ways to reduce the
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inappropriate user actions, thereby increasing organizations’ and individuals’ information
security.

Recommendations
Results of this study make it clear that further research is needed. Areas for future
research include assessing individuals’ security practices and behaviors in other
organization or business environments. Moreover, because the results of the study
challenged the literature by indicating that younger employees were more security aware
than older employees, an effort should be made to verify the results of this study.
Another area for further research is that of assessing organizations’ security training to
determine whether training improves the awareness levels of individuals. These
recommendations can be used to avert the inappropriate user actions and reduce the
number of internal security threats.

Summary
Threats to information security are constantly growing and vary from organization to
organization, but the one threat that remains the same, regardless of the type of
organization, is the insider security threat (Carroll, 2006). Insider security threats
resulting from poor judgment or inappropriate actions by a user continue to be a
significant security problem within all types of organizations (Aytes & Connolly, 2004).
Inappropriate actions include any of the following: (a) leaving a laptop or sensitive
document unattended, (b) inadvertently installing a virus from an e-mail attachment, (c)
downloading unauthorized software, (d) reconfiguring a workstation’s security setting,
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(e) disabling a firewall, (f) providing personal information, or (g) failing to protect a
password (Blyth & Kovacich, 2006). Insider threats may not occur as frequently as
external attacks, but they have a higher rate of success, can go undetected, and pose a
greater risk than an external attack (Chinchani et al., 2005). These internal threats
continue to pose a significant security challenge within any organization. One way to
lessen the impact of these security challenges is through information assurance training.
Information assurance training not only raises users’ awareness levels but also provides
users with the ability to recognize and prevent any inappropriate actions. However, prior
to conducting any security training, an organization security manager must assess the
organization’s state of security awareness (Blyth & Kovacich, 2006).
The purpose of this study was to assess the security behaviors and practices of
common system users. Previous research in assessing the security behavior of a user had
been conducted by Katz (2005). To measure the participants’ security behavior, Katz
used a 5-point Likert scale in a self-administered, closed-ended quantitative
questionnaire. Because this study was a continuation of the work conducted by Katz,
permission was obtained from Katz to adapt his methodology. This adaptation included
replacing the physical and location questions with questions regarding security training.
Because a user’s behavior can be influenced by demographic groups, this adaptation also
included examining the influence on the security behavior of four demographic groups:
gender, age, education, and occupation. This survey instrument was designed in two
sections: the demographic section, which used a binary scale to gather the participants’
demographic data, and a security section, which used a 5-point Likert scale to measure
the participants’ security behavior.
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Eighty-seven of the 288 employees at the General Dynamic and Program Manager
Advanced Amphibious Assault (GD & PM AAA) Facility in Woodbridge, Virginia,
completed the survey for a return rate of 30%. Results of this study were based on those
completed surveys. The participants’ responses were used to answer four demographic
questions concerning gender, age, education, and occupation and the research question.
The demographic data were analyzed using a t test, and the population security data were
analyzed using the Pearson chi-square test. To determine whether the findings were
statistically significant for specific demographic groups and the population as a whole, a
probability of less than 5% (p < .05) was used.
The results for the gender demographic group were statistically significant, indicating
that females were more security aware than their male counterparts. The results for the
age demographic group were also statistically significant, indicating that participants
aged 39 or younger were more security aware than their older counterparts aged 40 or
more. Furthermore, for the education demographic group, the results were again
statistically significant, indicating that participants who had not attended college were
more security aware than their higher educated counterparts. In addition, the results for
the demographic group classified as to position type were statistically significant,
indicating that participants in nontechnical positions were more security aware than those
who were in technical positions. Finally, the results addressing the research question
were also statistically significant, indicating that a relation exists between users’ security
behaviors and their levels of security awareness.
A review of security items on the survey that received the highest and lowest scores
for demographic groups and the total population indicated the following. The
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participants knew whom to contact if they received a virus alert. However, only 40.2%
of the participants always scanned their email attachments for viruses while 58.2% did
not, leaving their systems vulnerable to a virus attack. In addition, 40.6% of the
participants never allowed others access to their system while 59.4% did so, making their
systems or the data on their systems vulnerable to compromised. Finally, 44.8% of the
participants never used the automatic/save password feature on their computers while
55.2% did use the feature, leaving their system passwords vulnerable to compromise.
In conclusion, the results indicated that the gender, occupation, and education
demographics confirmed the literature findings; however, the age demographic indicated
that younger participants were more security aware, disputing the literature that stated
that older participants were more security aware. Although the research question
indicated that a relation between individuals’ security behavior and their level of security
awareness exists, the overall response rate of the sample population was 58%, indicating
that 42% of the population was engaging in inappropriate security practices and behavior.
These results imply that the participants are either ignoring their training by engaging in
poor security practices or the security training provided did not raise their securityawareness level to prevent such poor practices.
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are copied directly or paraphrased in the document. Sources are properly credited
according to accepted standards for professional publications. I also certify that this
paper was prepared by me for this purpose.
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From: Frank Katz [mailto:Frank.Katz@armstrong.edu]
Sent: Monday, February 16, 2009 3:43 PM
To: Grant, Gordon (Cont)
Subject: Re: permission to use survey

I hereby give Gordon J. Grant permission to use my paper, "The Effect of a University
Information Security Survey on Instruction Methods in Information Security," published
in the Digital Library of the ACM and published and presented at InfosecCD 2005, in his
doctoral research.
Sincerely,
Frank H. Katz

----------------------------------Frank H. Katz
Assistant Professor
Department of Information Technology
Armstrong Atlantic State University
912-344-3192
-----------------------------------

>>> "Grant, Gordon (Cont)" <gjgrant@egginc.com> 2/16/2009 3:27 PM >>>
Prof Katz,
This is a following-up, per our phone conversation today 16 Feb 09 at 3:21 PM regarding
your granting me permission to use your survey for my dissertation. I need an email
response to place in my dissertation.
Thank you,
RS
Gordon J. Grant
gjgrant@egginc.com
703-445-3462

77
From: Grant, Gordon (Cont)
Sent: Tuesday, October 07, 2008 10:51 AM
To: 'Frank.Katz@armstrong.edu'
Cc: Grant, Gordon (Cont)
Subject: Permission to use survey
Importance: High
Professor Katz,
My dissertation is similar to the study you conducted and presented at the InfoSecCD
Conference in September 2005. Instead of surveying an academic environment I will be
surveying a research/manufacturing environment. I am therefore requesting permission
to use your survey as part of my dissertation.
RS
Gordon J. Grant
PhD candidate
Nova Southeastern University
703-441-7071
gjgrant@egginc.com
grantg@nsu.nova.edu
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Grant, Gordon (Cont)
From: OBrien Maj William E
Sent: Thursday, September 11, 2008 2:48 PM
To: Grant CTR Gordon J
Subject: RE: Conduct PhD Survey
Mr. Grant,
Col Moore has authorized the Advanced Amphibious Assault program
office to participate in your survey. This is strictly on a
volunteer basis and will be contained only on the government side
to include contractors that are in direct support of government
functions. Your initial solicitation will be via e-mail with the
attached survey form for individuals to print out, answer the
questions then return to myself. I will collect these forms then
immediate place them in my government safe until the deadline for
submission has passed. I will then place the completed surveys
into one envelope and provide them to you.
I am still working the total number of personnel here that will
be provided the opportunity to participate in your survey.
r/
Maj O'Brien
703 492 3308
-----Original Message----From: Grant CTR Gordon J
Sent: Tuesday, August 19, 2008 11:09 AM
To: OBrien Maj William E
Cc: Grant CTR Gordon J; 'gjgrant@egginc.com'
Subject: Conduct PhD Survey
Maj O'Brien
As per our conversation on Thursday 7 August at the Clubs at
Quantico enclosed is what we discussed.
I am a contractor supporting System Engineering (SE) and a PhD
student at Nova Southeastern University (NSU). The purpose of my
dissertation is to evaluate the information security behavior of
individuals. The intent is to take a snapshot of the current
information assurance awareness practices of the common user
within PM AAA and General Dynamics facility. The results of this
survey will provide academic and security community with a means
of assessing and developing better ways in preventing security
threats.
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To do this I would like to e-mail my survey to everyone in the
command intranet. Because this research is with human subjects
prior to being able to submit my survey it will have to be
reviewed and approved by PM AAA and my schools (NSU)
Institutional Review Board (IRB). If PM AAA has an IRB
representative they would also have to review the survey prior to
submission.
I am therefore requesting permission to conduct my survey via the
PM AAA intranet.
Enclosed is a copy of the survey for your review. If there are
any questions or problems feel free to contact me.
RS
Gordon Grant
Principal System Engineer
Alion Science & Technology/EG&G CEOss Team
703-441-7071
gjgrant@egginc.com
grantgj.ctr@efv.usmc.mil
ggrant@alionscience.com
Note: (FYI)
The IRB is a federal regulation that protects the rights and
privacy of human subjects involved in research activities. The
National Research Act Public Law 99-158, the Health Research
Extension Act of 9185, and the National Commission for the
Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral
Research provide guidelines for research with human subjects to
ensure their protection in the design and conduct of research.
These federal regulations require that any institution requesting
and receiving funds from a federal department or agency for
research involving human subjects must assure that such research
is reviewed and approved by the institution's IRB.
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NOVA SOUTHEASTERN UNIVERSITY
Office of Grants and Contracts
Institutional Review Board

MEMORANDUM
To:

Gordon Grant

From:

Ling Wang, Ph.D.
Institutional Review Board

Date:

Jan. 29, 2009

Re:
Ascertaining the Relationship between Security Awareness and the Security
Behavior of Individuals
IRB Approval Number: wang11150801
I have reviewed the above-referenced research protocol at the center level. Based on the
information provided, I have determined that this study is exempt from further IRB
review. You may proceed with your study as described to the IRB. As principal
investigator, you must adhere to the following requirements:
1)

CONSENT: If recruitment procedures include consent forms these must be
obtained in such a manner that they are clearly understood by the subjects and the
process affords subjects the opportunity to ask questions, obtain detailed answers
from those directly involved in the research, and have sufficient time to consider
their participation after they have been provided this information. The subjects
must be given a copy of the signed consent document, and a copy must be placed
in a secure file separate from de-identified participant information. Record of
informed consent must be retained for a minimum of three years from the
conclusion of the study.

2)

ADVERSE REACTIONS: The principal investigator is required to notify the
IRB chair and me (954-262-5369 and 954-262-2020 respectively) of any adverse
reactions or unanticipated events that may develop as a result of this study.
Reactions or events may include, but are not limited to, injury, depression as a
result of participation in the study, life-threatening situation, death, or loss of
confidentiality/anonymity of subject. Approval may be withdrawn if the problem
is serious.
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3)

AMENDMENTS: Any changes in the study (e.g., procedures, number or types of
subjects, consent forms, investigators, etc.) must be approved by the IRB prior to
implementation. Please be advised that changes in a study may require further
review depending on the nature of the change. Please contact me with any
questions regarding amendments or changes to your study.

The NSU IRB is in compliance with the requirements for the protection of human
subjects prescribed in Part 46 of Title 45 of the Code of Federal Regulations (45 CFR 46)
revised June 18, 1991.
Cc:

Protocol File

3301 College Avenue Fort Lauderdale, FL 33314-7796 (954) 262-5369
Fax: (954) 262-3977 E-mail: inga@nsu.nova.edu Web site: www.nova.edu/cwis/ogc
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INFORMATION ASSURANCE QUESTIONNAIRE

My name is Gordon Grant and I am a PhD candidate at Nova Southeastern
University (NSU) Graduate School of Computer and Information Sciences. By
completing this survey you will assist me with my dissertation which is dedicated in
evaluating information assurance practices. The intent of this survey is to take a snapshot
of the current information assurance practices within your organization. The results of
this survey will provide academic and security researchers with the means of assessing
and developing better ways in preventing unintentional security threats that can lead to
identity theft.
This survey is constructed in two sections: demographics (section-1), and security
(section-2). This survey should only take 2 minutes to complete. In keeping with NSU
Institutional Review Board (IRB) requirements, at no time will any identifying
information be asked of you or be given out. All information provided will be kept
strictly confidential and any identifying information on the questionnaire will be
discarded upon receipt. The results of this survey will be presented as percentages or
graphs.
Please answer each question candidly and submit the completed survey with this cover
sheet to the Operations Officer (Major O’Brien). Refer all questions to:
grantg@nsu.nova.edu or gjgrant@egginc.com

Consent statement:
[ ] I consent to participate in this study.
(please check)

Thank you for your assistance.
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SECTION – 1
DEMOGRAPHICS

Instructions:
1. This section will gather demographic information (e.g., gender, age, education,
and occupation) from each participant which will be used to set up the variables
for the statistical analysis.
2. Please place an ―X‖ in the appropriate column box located to the right of the
question.
Explanation of the questions:
1. Question 1: self explanatory
2. Question 2: self explanatory
3. Question 3: a ―Yes‖ indicates that you attended or received a college diploma or
degree
4. Question 4: self explanatory

Please check the box that describes you:
Yes
1. Are you a female?
2. Are you age 40 and over?
3. Are you a college graduate?
4. Are you in a technical position?

No
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SECTION – 2
SECURITY QUESTIONS

Instructions:
1. Please read through the following explanations to understand each choice on the
questionnaire.
a. Always is when you perform the action all the time
b. Sometimes is when you performed the action several times a week
c. Neutral is when you do not understand the question, you are unsure about
how to answer the question, the question does not apply or you do not
want to answer the question
d. Seldom is when you performed the action once a month
e. Never you do not performed this action
2. Then place an ―X‖ in the box to the right of the question that most closely
describes your actions.
3. Remember to answer every question candidly. There are no ―right‖ or ―wrong‖
answers, this survey is to get a better idea on current computer security practices.
4. All information will be kept confidential; any identifying information will be
discarded upon receipt.
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Section – 2
SECURITY QUESTIONS

Please check the appropriate box that most closely describes your actions:
Always

Sometime

Neutral

Seldo
m

1. Do you participate in security training?
2. Do you know who to contact if you get
a virus alert?
3. Do you lock your screen or use a
screensaver when you leave your
computer?
4. Do you scan all e-mail attachments for
viruses?
5. Do you use the automatic
save/remember password feature on your
computer?
6. Do other people have access or use of
your computer?
7. Do you download anything from the
web (e.g., applications, upgrades, music,
video clips, etc.)?

Thank you for participating in this survey.
Please return the completed questionnaire to Major O’Brien

Never
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Raw Data
Section-1 Demographics Questionnaire
Table F1. Demographic Responses.
1. Gender

Yes

No

Are you a female?

20

67

2. Age

Yes

No

Are you age 40 and over?

53

34

3. Education

Yes

No

Are you a college graduate?

65

22

4. Occupation

Yes

No

Are you in a technical position?

56

31
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Raw Data
Section-2 Security Questionnaire
Table F2. Security Responses by Sample Population.
Always

Sometime

Neutral

Seldo
m

Never

1. Do you participate in security training?

61

10

5

9

2

2. Do you know who to contact if you get
a virus alert?

79

3

2

0

3

3. Do you lock your screen or use a screen
saver when you leave your computer?

57

26

1

2

1

4. Do you scan all e-mail attachments for
viruses?

35

9

11

12

20

5. Do you use the automatic
save/remember password feature on your
computer?

9

19

5

15

39

6. Do other people have access or use of
your computer?

7

16

6

18

40

7. Do you download anything from the
web (e.g., applications, upgrades, music,
video clips, etc.)?

0

20

1

24

42
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Table F3. Security Responses by Gender (Female/Male).
Always

Sometime

Neutral

Seldo
m

Never

Female

14

2

2

2

0

Male

47

8

3

7

2

Female

18

0

1

0

1

Male

61

3

1

0

2

Female

13

7

0

0

0

Male

44

19

1

2

1

Female

10

2

1

1

6

Male

25

7

10

11

14

Female

3

4

0

4

9

Male

6

15

5

11

30

Female

2

2

0

9

7

Male

5

14

6

9

33

Female

0

5

0

3

12

Male

0

15

1

21

30

1. Do you participate in security training?

2. Do you know who to contact if you get
a virus alert?

3. Do you lock your screen or use a screen
saver when you leave your computer?

4. Do you scan all e-mail attachments for
viruses?

5. Do you use the automatic
save/remember password feature on your
computer?

6. Do other people have access or use of
your computer?

7. Do you download anything from the
web (e.g., applications, upgrades, music,
video clips, etc.)?
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Table F4. Security Responses by Age (40 & over/39 & under).
Always

Sometime

Neutral

Seldo
m

Never

Age 40 & Over

39

4

5

3

2

Age 39 & Under

22

6

0

6

0

Age 40 & Over

48

2

2

0

1

Age 39 & Under

31

1

0

0

2

Age 40 & Over

34

17

1

0

1

Age 39 & Under

23

9

0

2

0

Age 40 & Over

20

5

6

8

14

Age 39 & Under

15

4

5

4

6

Age 40 & Over

8

13

2

8

22

Age 39 & Under

1

6

3

7

17

Age 40 & Over

4

12

3

14

20

Age 39 & Under

3

4

3

4

20

Age 40 & Over

0

14

1

13

25

Age 39 & Under

0

6

0

11

17

1. Do you participate in security training?

2. Do you know who to contact if you get
a virus alert?

3. Do you lock your screen or use a screen
saver when you leave your computer?

4. Do you scan all e-mail attachments for
viruses?

5. Do you use the automatic
save/remember password feature on your
computer?

6. Do other people have access or use of
your computer?

7. Do you download anything from the
web (e.g., applications, upgrades, music,
video clips, etc.)?
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Table F5. Security Responses by Education (College/No-College).
Always

Sometime

Neutral

Seldo
m

Never

College

45

6

5

8

1

No-College

16

4

0

1

1

College

59

2

2

0

2

No-College

20

1

0

0

1

College

40

21

1

2

1

No-College

17

5

0

0

0

College

25

6

7

10

17

No-College

10

3

4

2

3

College

9

17

1

14

24

No-College

0

2

4

1

15

College

4

11

6

11

33

No-College

3

5

0

7

7

College

0

14

1

20

30

No-College

0

6

0

4

12

1. Do you participate in security training?

2. Do you know who to contact if you get
a virus alert?

3. Do you lock your screen or use a screen
saver when you leave your computer?

4. Do you scan all e-mail attachments for
viruses?

5. Do you use the automatic
save/remember password feature on your
computer?

6. Do other people have access or use of
your computer?

7. Do you download anything from the
web (e.g., applications, upgrades, music,
video clips, etc.)?
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Table F6. Security Responses by Occupation (Technical/Nontechnical).
Always

Sometime

Neutral

Seldo
m

Never

Technical

36

7

5

6

2

Nontechnical

25

3

0

3

0

Technical

53

1

1

0

1

Nontechnical

26

2

1

0

2

Technical

36

17

1

1

1

Nontechnical

21

9

0

1

0

Technical

22

5

10

8

11

Nontechnical

13

4

1

4

9

Technical

5

16

2

8

25

Nontechnical

4

3

3

7

14

Technical

5

11

5

14

21

Nontechnical

2

5

1

4

19

Technical

0

13

1

17

25

Nontechnical

0

7

0

7

17

1. Do you participate in security training?

2. Do you know who to contact if you get
a virus alert?

3. Do you lock your screen or use a screen
saver when you leave your computer?

4. Do you scan all e-mail attachments for
viruses?

5. Do you use the automatic
save/remember password feature on your
computer?

6. Do other people have access or use of
your computer?

7. Do you download anything from the
web (e.g., applications, upgrades, music,
video clips, etc.)?
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